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Abstract
While ￿nancial liberalization has in general favorable e⁄ects, reforms in countries with
poor regulation is often followed by ￿nancial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome
of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors
must rely on enforcement of investor protection, which may be structured so as to block funding
for new entrants, or limit their access to re￿nance after a shock. This forces ine¢ cient default
and exit by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result,
lobbying may deliberately worsen ￿nancial fragility. After large external shocks, borrowers from
the political elite in very corrupt countries may successfully lobby for weak enforcement, and
retain control of collateral. We provide evidence that industry exit rates and pro￿t margins
after banking crises are higher in the most corrupt countries.
1 Introduction
Recent evidence suggests that ￿nancial development, in particular the amount of credit to the private
sector, is correlated with subsequent economic growth (Levine, 2004). This is particularly true in
sectors relying on external ￿nance (Black and Strahan, 2002; Rajan and Zingales, 1998), and appears
essential for new entry (Perotti and Volpin, 2004). Such evidence supports reforms which encourage
￿nancial development. While lack of funding is not the sole obstacle for potential entrepreneurs
(McMillan and Woodru⁄, 2002), access to external ￿nancing provides resources to overcome generic
entry barriers.1 Policies promoting ￿nancial development, such as improved investor protection
￿University of Amsterdam and the World Bank; University of Amsterdam and CEPR. We thank Stijn Claessens,
Simon Johnson, Randall Morck, Lev Ratnovski, Jean Laurent Rosenthal, Hyun Shin, and participants at the Confer-
ence on Endogenous Institutional Change at Stanford, the 6th International Conference on Financial Development
and Governance in Moscow, seminars at the University of Amsterdam, the IMF, the World Bank, HEC Paris and
the CFS Finance Workshop for useful comments. We retain all responsibility for any errors.
1Formal entry requirements are very onerous in developing countries (Djankov et al., 2002), and may be created
just to extract bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2003) show that entry barriers reduceand ￿nancial liberalization which in principle increase the quantity and quality of external ￿nance,
appear therefore well justi￿ed.
Many ￿nancial liberalizations are indeed successful at expanding capital markets and promote
investment (Henry, 2003)2. They also appear to improve consumption smoothing, as there is on av-
erage a decline in volatility of consumption following liberalizations (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad,
2004).3 Yet liberalization has had a mixed success in developing countries. While it produces rapid
expansion in credit and foreign investment, and raise short term economic growth, in many countries
it has been followed by severe banking crises after external shocks. These crises, often coupled with
sharp currency devaluations (as in Mexico, South East Asia, and Russia), in￿ icted massive losses
to investors and taxpayers, and contributed to deep recessions. Yet ￿nancial development should
have just strengthened the ability of ￿rms to resist external shocks.
What explains this variation in outcomes? Speci￿cally, when does liberalization lead to ￿nancial
vulnerability? Poor institutions are increasingly perceived to be at the root of policy failure (for
evidence, see Acemoglu et al, 2003). Indeed, liberalization is more likely to be followed by banking
crises in countries with worse institutions or poor transparency (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache,
1998; Mehrez and Kaufmann, 1999; Keefer, 2001).
In this paper we argue that poor political institutions allow the capture of the design and
implementation of ￿nancial regulation by incumbent interest groups. For instance, ￿nancial reforms
could be designed primarily to expand access for existing ￿rms (￿nancial deepening), rather than to
expand the range of ￿nancial services and borrowers, facilitating new entry (￿nancial broadening).
There is a natural con￿ ict on ￿nancial development facilitating entry between more established and
emerging classes (Rajan and Zingales, 2003, Perotti and Volpin, 2005). The local legal environment
matters even after liberalization, as market investor decisions depend on the reliability of their
claims. Speci￿cally, the quality of investor protection is critical to allow a fair decentralized process
of ￿nancial allocation.
We model the choice of investor protection as taken by elected politicians under the in￿ uence
of lobbying, rather than chosen directly by voters, although a⁄ected by some measure of political
accountability.4 In such a context, richer entrepreneurs lobby for lower investor protection to limit
access to ￿nance by competitors (Perotti and Volpin, 2004). We develop here a dynamic setting,
growth and entry in naturally high entry sectors and do not seem justi￿ed on reasons of public welfare.
2Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar, 2004.show how the French banking liberalization in the 1980s improved the
allocation of capital while broadening access to ￿nance.
3This result is reversed in countries with weak democratic institutions.
4Median voter models, which assume maximum accountability, are appropriate to model legislative choices at best
in highly democratic countries. See Pagano and Volpin, forthcoming; Perotti and von Thadden, forthcoming; Berglof
and Bolton (2003).
￿2 ￿where investor protection a⁄ects not only ex ante access to ￿nance, but also ex post re￿nancing
after an external shock. Our main result is that even when liberalization increases entry, investor
protection may be distorted to ensure exit after an external shock by poorer, more leveraged pro-
ducers.
We obtain three distinct equilibria, corresponding to di⁄erent ￿nancial "regimes", as a function
of political accountability. They lead to di⁄erent entry and exit rates, and di⁄erent degrees of
￿nancial fragility. In countries with high democratic accountability5, bribing politicians to block
entry of poor entrepreneurs is very expensive, so investor protection will ensure access for all to
￿nance and re￿nance after a shock. At intermediate levels of accountability, lobbying to block
entry is still too costly, but investor protection may be set deliberately low so as to limit access
to re￿nancing after a shock. This reduces competition for rich producers as the poorer, more
leveraged producers are forced to exit. This form of involuntary default is a case of deliberately
induced fragility. Finally, when democratic accountability is very weak, the rich ￿nd it attractive to
lobby for very low investor protection so as to block any access by poor entrepreneurs. We term
this case a "narrow" ￿nancial equilibrium.6
Next we explore the extreme case when a large shock may reduce pro￿tability to the point
when borrowers may prefer to seize assets and run. In order to do so, borrowers may lobby for a
weakening of creditor rights. Evidence of the di¢ culty in seizing collateral has been much cited
after the Asian, Mexican and Russian crisis.7 We show that such strategic default will tend to occur
in the countries with worse political institutions. More generally, our prediction is that the extend
of exit after crises will be worse in the most corrupt institutional environment, and that this will
cushion pro￿tability for more established producers.
We next present evidence from a broad panel of industries and countries, adopting Rajan and
Zingales￿ s (1998) methodology to control for endogeneity and missing variables at the level of indus-
try and country. Consistent with the model, producer margins during banking crisis are higher for
￿nancially dependent ￿rms in countries with worse institutions, speci￿cally measures of corruption.
More poignantly, we are able to show that the e⁄ect is correlated with abnormally higher exit rates
in ￿nancially dependent industries, precisely the prediction of the model. We are not aware of any
study which could explain why corruption should lead to higher exit after crises in such sectors.
Interestingly, other institutional variables such as the rule of law or other measures of political
5We de￿ne political accountability as constraints on executive power.
6There is clear cross country evidence that entry rates are very sensitive to corruption. Perotti and Volpin (2004)
show that a higher democracy score is associated with higher entry in sectors more dependent on external capital.
7Friedman et al (2003) review evidence that in these countries, most creditors could not "e⁄ectively take control
of collateral" after a ￿nancial crisis. Bankrupty in Thailand typically takes up to 10 years and creditors ultimately
receive very little (Foley, 1999). For evidence from the Asian crisis that tunnelling may be worse in recessions, see
Johnson et al., 2000.
￿3 ￿structure, per se highly correlated with corruption, do not seem to explain pro￿t changes or exit
rates signi￿cantly. This appears consistent with our explanation based on lobbying. Two testable
implications we have not yet explored are that greater inequality and more volatile shocks should
increase ￿nancial fragility. Interestingly, volatility leads to a fragile regime not because it implies
larger losses, but because it reduces expected pro￿tability. This increases the incentive by the rich
elite to lobby harder for weaker investor protection to protect its rents.
We discuss next the related literature and some related empirical evidence. Section 3 presents
the basic model. Section 4 contains the comparative statics and the extensions. Section 5 presents
the empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The literature on ￿nancial crises initially considered crises as the outcome of fundamental macro-
economic unbalances. Second generation models suggest that crises may arise under self-ful￿lling
expectations (e.g. Chang and Velasco, 1998, and Allen and Gale, 1998). In the third generation
class of models, unbalances arise because of poor incentives due to weak institutions or poor policies
(e.g. Krugman (1998), Corsetti et al (1999)). Our approach is to endogenize the quality of regula-
tory and legal institutions as a political choice. In our model, poor regulation (and thus ￿nancial
fragility) is deliberately created to capture bene￿ts while socializing losses, which potentially can
give rise to a liquidity crisis for ￿rms of poorer entrepreneurs.
A growing body of empirical evidence shows that political and economical elites can manipulate
institutions (Glaeser et al, 2003). Politically powerful interest lobbies in￿ uence the type of property
rights protection which suits their interests best (Morck, Yeung and Wolfenzohn, forthcoming).
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) show that countries with higher entry
barriers tend to have higher corruption and larger uno¢ cial economies. Fisman and Sarria-Allende
(2004) and Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2004) show that onerous barriers appear to reduce growth
and entry in naturally high entry sectors and o⁄er evidence against the notion that such barriers
serve e¢ ciency purposes. Johnson et al (2002) ￿nd evidence of high marginal returns at a low level
of capital investment, as well as tight ￿nancial constraints for poor individuals.
Incumbents have an incentive to oppose ￿nancial development because it breeds competition,
hence eroding their rents (Rajan and Zingales (2003)).8 Claessens and Perotti (2004) observe that
most liberalization programs in emerging countries have focused on ￿nancial deepening rather than
on ￿nancial broadening, e.g. emphasizing the size of capital in￿ ows rather than their di⁄usion.
Investor protection is arguably a simple and stealthy barrier to entry. Poor minority protection
8Poor political accountability may be in itself the historical consequence of a narrow initial entry, which entrenches
a political structure dominated by established interests (Engermann and Sokolo⁄, 1997, Acemoglu et al, 2003).
￿4 ￿appears indeed to limit access to ￿nance particularly for SMEs (Beck et al, 2004) and in ￿nancially
dependent sectors, especially in countries with low accountability (Perotti and Volpin, 2004). Ef-
fective investor protection is associated with democratic accountability and legal origin, even after
controlling for economic development (Perotti and Volpin, 2004).
Political institutions seem to have a ￿rst order e⁄ect on economic and ￿nancial stability, even
after controlling for policy choices (Acemoglu et al (2003)). Poor transparency and corruption
(Mehrez and Kaufman, 1999), and weak regulatory institutions (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache
1998), increases the probability of a banking crisis after liberalization. Rajan (2004) argues that
limited credibility of institutions reduce foreign currency liquidity and leads to crises. Kaminsky and
Schmukler (2003) show evidence that ￿nancial liberalization often leads to intensi￿ed boom-bust
cycles in the short term, especially in countries with poor law and order. Yet liberalization does
not per se lead to ￿nancial crises; while there exists some correlation (Tornell et al, 2004), many
liberalization reforms succeed. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004) show that while consump-
tion volatility decreases with ￿nancial openness also in the set of liberalizing developing countries,
countries with poor political institutions exhibit increased volatility.9
Even when liberalization leads to higher average GDP growth, the distribution of gains remains
a relevant question to ensure its sustainability. Elites appear to do comparatively well in ￿nancial
distress. In Latin-America, ￿nancial transfers following banking crises targeted privileged income
classes (Halac and Schmukler, 2002). At the same time, default costs are usually socialized via
regressive policies, such as in￿ ationary bailouts and budget cuts which disproportionately hurt
weaker social groups as well as median income households (Das and Mohapatra, 2003).10 Banking
crises have large ￿scal costs because of government guarantees, liquidity injections, and regulatory
forbearance (Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven, 2004).11 Clearly, when bene￿ts are concentrated
while losses are socialized, a political backlash will follow, as suggested by recent evidence on Latin
American public opinion on liberalization (The Economist, October 2003).
Could it be that ￿nancial liberalization concentrate funding because it initially favors ￿rms
with established comparative advantages? Should ￿nancial deepening be prioritized over ￿nancial
broadening? There is a literature arguing for encouraging related lending as the sole form of
enforceable credit in some contexts (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Yet recent evidence indicates
that concentration of funding does not produced better returns in weak institutional settings. Losses
on larger loans have been much larger than for smaller loans, particularly for connected lending to
9Bekaert et al (2004) also conclude that "political factors are more important than legal factors in driving con-
sumption growth volatility".
10The worse impact is not on the poorest decile, who hardly participate in the formal economy and have little to
lose (Maloney, Cunningham and Bosch, 2004).
11They also show that the size of transfers do not improve economic recovery, which is higher in countries with
lower corruption, better measures of law and order, legal enforcement, and quality of the bureaucracy.
￿5 ￿powerful groups (on Mexico, see La Porta et al, 2002, and Haber, 2004; on Russia, see Laeven, 2001;
on Pakistan, see Khwaja and Mian, 2004; on Thailand, see Wiwattanakantang et al, forthcoming).12
Remarkably, few assets have been repossessed in these countries when connected ￿rms default.
There is also evidence that incumbency undermines growth (He, Morck and Yeung, 2003). Morck
et al (2000) show that a higher concentration of inherited billionaire wealth in a country has a
depressing e⁄ect on economic growth. Banking crises appear also to be associated with unchallenged
incumbency: they are more common in countries with historically high barriers to entry in banking,
even though actual banking sector concentration has a positive direct e⁄ect (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine, 2003).
In a dynamic setting, encouraging access to capital for emerging producers is likely to be optimal.
Entry is a critical determinant of economic renewal and enhanced competitiveness. Beck et al
(2004) o⁄er cross-country evidence on the importance of SME for growth. McMillan and Woodru⁄
(2002) document the role played by new entrepreneurs in determining the relative economic success
across transition countries. Finally, greater ￿nancial broadening creates political support for market
reforms, and makes them more sustainable (Biais and Perotti, 2002; Perotti and Von Thadden,
forthcoming).
Financial constraints are also critical to the work by Caballero and Krishnamurty (2003), who
model an emerging market crisis where ￿rms with valuable projects cannot borrow after a produc-
tivity shock because a collateral constraint is binding, following Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). In
our approach, the ability to pledge collateral is an endogenous political choice.
While we treat inequality and accountability as unrelated, there are reasons to expect inequality
to reduce accountability. For instance, in highly unequal countries, poorly paid public o¢ cials may
be more vulnerable to bribes. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) show that corruption is higher in
countries where bureaucrats￿income is low relative to manufacturing wages.
The next sections present and solve the basic model, discuss some extensions and o⁄er brief
conclusions.
3 The Model
3.1 Agents and Technology
Consider a small economy where the interest rate is zero. The population has a normalized size of
1 and consists of m < 1
2 entrepreneurs and 1 ￿ m consumers. Consumer i has quasi-linear utility
UC




12Excessive concentration of lending can also take place under state in￿uence, favoring mostly large state-owned
enterprises, such as in Central Europe during the early transition period.
￿6 ￿where ki is consumption of the numeraire good (apples) and ci is consumption of the end good (ap-
ples pies). The representative consumer is endowed with !c > 0 apples. For simplicity, entrepreneur
j only values consumption of apples with utility
UE
j = kj. (2)
There are two types of entrepreneurs: the rich with mass ￿R and the poor with mass ￿P, so
that m ￿ ￿R + ￿P. The poor have zero endowment, hence !P = 0. The rich are endowed with
0 < !R < 1. Both have identical projects which require an investment of 1 apple and produce
1 apple pie13. Hence to fund production, a poor entrepreneur needs to raise 1 apple externally
whereas a rich one only needs 1￿!R apples. Alternatively, entrepreneurs can save their endowment
in a riskless asset. Consumers can invest only in the riskless asset.
At an intermediate date the state of the economy ￿ may su⁄er an external shock with probability
q 2 (0;1). In state ￿ = s, all projects are a⁄ected, and all require an immediate liquidity injection






where yi is total income.
We assume that all projects have a positive net present value even in case of full production
(when the price of apple pies is lowest)
Condition 1 p(m) > 1 + q￿,
where p(m) is the price of apple pies in case when m entrepreneurs produce.
For consumers and inactive entrepreneurs, their net income equals the return from riskless
savings. For an active entrepreneur j her income is pro￿ts minus repayment. An entrepreneur who
is not re￿nanced after the shock has zero income.
The sequence of events, depicted in Figure 1, is as follows:
At date 1, entrepreneurs form an interest group to lobby politicians.
At date 2, the lobby groups lobby politicians on investor protection ￿. We assume that once ￿
is set, it cannot be changed.
At date 3, entrepreneurs decide whether to invest in their project and seek external ￿nance,
banks choose which entrepreneurs to fund, and compete to o⁄er debt.
13Although this technology is discrete, making the production choice continuous does not change the results of the
model qualitatively. The intuition is that in the lobby game this will be anticipated by adjusting ￿ accordingly.
￿7 ￿At date 4, the interim stage, a liquidity shock may occur with probability q. In this case all
entrepreneurs need some re￿nancing equal to ￿. If the bank denies the request, all production is
lost and the entrepreneur defaults. The bank seizes the salvage value M.
At the ￿nal date 5, active entrepreneurs produce, the riskless asset is liquidated, the price p of
apple pies is determined in the market, and consumption takes place. Active entrepreneurs choose
to default or repay their loans. The promised political contribution is paid.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
3.2 Financing
All entrepreneurs need some external ￿nance to fund entry. In case of a shock, additional liquidity
￿ is needed to continue production. Entrepreneurs who are able to raise external ￿nance to start a
￿rm may or may not be able to obtain additional re￿nancing.
In our context, pro￿ts can take only two values, so there is no meaningful distinction between
debt and equity for active ￿rms. If a ￿rm is denied re￿nancing, however, its pro￿ts are zero and there
is a salvage value M, where M < 1, which external ￿nanciers are able to seize14. We accordingly
refer to investors as banks contributing loans.15 In the basic model, we initially assume that all
projects are funded by foreign banks.16
We assume that the NPV of all projects is still positive after a shock , so that re￿nancing is
always e¢ cient, even when there is full entry
Condition 2 p(m) > M + ￿,
Finally, in order for a bank to be willing to re￿nance at least some entrepreneurs after a shock
, it must be better to recoup the loan instead of seizing M directly. This requires that the size of
the smallest possible loan (i.e. to the rich entrepreneurs) is larger than M
Condition 3 M < 1 ￿ !R.
While rich entrepreneurs need to raise an amount 1 ￿ !R, poor entrepreneurs need to raise the
entire investment cost of 1. The ability to raise ￿nancing depends on legal investor protection ￿,
14For simplicity, we simply assume that M is always entirely seizable by ￿nanciers.
15Our results are not a⁄ected if we assume that assets under liquidation may also be partially appropriated. In
fact, partial appropriation after early default would never emerge as a political demand by lobbysts, since liquidation
is ine¢ cient for every type of entrepreneur.
16This assumption ensures that demand for apple pies is independent of default, since foreigners bear all ex post
default costs. We analyze domestic funding in a later section.
￿8 ￿which is the fraction of future revenue which can be reliably promised to investors. In other words,
an entrepreneur can always appropriate a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of pro￿ts with no penalty. Thus whenever
the debt of an agent is higher than the "collateralizable" fraction ￿ of her pro￿t p, the bank can
expect to receive at most ￿p. The value of ￿ is a political choice, taken under the in￿ uence of
lobbying, and is exogenous for any individual entrepreneur.
Thus actual repayment depends on whether ￿p is greater or smaller than the amount the entre-
preneur has to pay to the bank: If there was no need for re￿nancing, banks would be willing to lend
entrepreneur j an amount Aj against a face value of Dj as long as
Aj ￿ q min[￿pS;Dj + ￿] + (1 ￿ q)min[￿pN;Dj]; (4)
where pN and pS are the anticipated equilibrium prices in the normal and shock state, respec-
tively.
At the interim stage, in case of a shock , the bank chooses whether to re￿nance individual
projects, or refuse in which case output is zero and the bank receives the salvage value M. Banks
will re￿nance a project only if its leverage Dj satis￿es
M + ￿ ￿ min[￿pS;Dj + ￿]: (5)
Thus if ￿ is low enough banks may prefer not to re￿nance, since by assumption M < Dj.
We denote by A the set of entrepreneurs who receive ex ante ￿nancing. Set A contains two
subsets: Subset NF contains all entrepreneurs who will be refused additional funding in case of a
shock . Subset F consists only of entrepreneurs who will receive re￿nancing. As we will see, the
composition of the two sets are directly a⁄ected by the choice over investor protection ￿:
3.3 The Political System
At date 2 we allow lobbying of politicians on investor protection ￿. We assume politicians set ￿
and care about both social welfare W and political contributions L. Social welfare is de￿ned as the
weighted sum of consumer and entrepreneur utility:
W ￿ (1 ￿ m) ￿ (indirect utility of consumers) + (pro￿ts of entrepreneurs). (6)
The utility of politicians is
UP = ￿W + (1 ￿ ￿)L, (7)
where ￿ can be interpreted as political accountability or the sensitivity of politicians towards bribes.
Both rich and poor are represented by a lobbyist who attempts to in￿ uence the decision on
investor protection ￿ 2 [0;1]. We make the standard assumption that consumers are too dispersed
￿9 ￿to form a lobby.
Once set, investor protection cannot be changed. Lobbyists can commit to paying a political
contribution, conditional on the choice of the politicians, and are able to extract a share of the
rents obtained from the group of entrepreneurs they represent. However, they cannot commit to
reallocate rents inside their lobby nor can they promise transfers to each other. 17
The sequence of the political game is as follows:
￿ Without loss of generality, the lobbyist for the rich makes its o⁄er ￿rst, followed by the lobbyist
for the poorer entrepreneurs.18
￿ Politicians choose between either o⁄er or the ￿rst best (maximum welfare) policy.
3.4 Product and Financial Market Equilibrium
We solve backwards for a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
3.4.1 Product Market Equilibrium
At the ￿nal date, consumers maximize their utility given by (1), subject to their budget constraint
(3). We assume their income !c is large enough such that each consumer demands some amount of
pies. The rest of income is devoted to consumption of apples, so k￿
i = !c ￿ p￿(a ￿ p￿).
The supply of pies is equal to the number of producing entrepreneurs n￿, therefore
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, total demand for pies is (1 ￿ m)(a ￿ p￿) and total supply is n￿. Hence
p￿(n￿) = a ￿ n
￿
1￿m. The indirect utility of consumer i is given by V ￿




We summarize the utility of individual entrepreneurs in Table 1. The total utility of entrepre-
neurs in the normal state is
R
j2A(pn ￿ Dj) dj , and in the shock state is
R
j2F(ps ￿ Dj ￿ ￿) dj.
Normal shock
Not ￿nanced !j !j
Financed and re￿nanced (Set F) Vj = pn ￿ Dj2F Vj = ps ￿ Dj2F ￿ ￿
Financed, but not re￿nanced (Set NF) Vj = pn ￿ Dj2NF 0
17This assumption excludes political coalitions, which would considerably complicate the analysis and are beyond
the scope of this paper.
18The sequential setting allows to endogenize lobbying agendas and ensures uniqueness. Our results also obtain in
a simultaneous lobbying game as in Grossman-Helpmann (1994), although it may have multiple equilibria.
￿10 ￿Table 1: Utility of entrepreneurs
Social welfare in the normal state is









(pn ￿ Dj) dj, (8)
and after the shock is









(ps ￿ Dj ￿ ￿) dj. (9)
To ensure social welfare is increasing in entry, we need that demand for the ￿nal good is strong
enough, .i.e. a ￿ 1 + ￿ + m
1￿m, which is just Condition 1. Hence
Lemma 2 Social welfare is increasing in the number of producing entrepreneurs n.
Proof. We will show that Ws is strictly increasing in ns, which immediately gives the result
for Wn. As long as NF 6= ?; welfare cannot be optimal, because entrepreneurs prefer re￿nance by
assumption and consumer indirect utility is increasing in the number of apple pies in the market.
When all entrepreneurs are included in F, Ws = (1 ￿ m)(!c + 1
2( n
s
1￿m)2) + ns(a ￿ n
s
1￿m ￿ ￿ ￿ 1).
Now @W
s
@ns = a ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ n
s
1￿m, which is nonnegative by Condition 1.
3.4.2 Financial Market Equilibrium
We restrict attention to the case when a bank would not re￿nance an entrepreneur if the bank
anticipates strategic default (as opposed to involuntary default)
Condition 4 M + ￿ > Min[￿pS, Dj + ￿] for any ￿nanced entrepreneur j.
This condition ensures that the bank prefers the salvage value M over the seizable value ￿pS
minus the opportunity cost ￿ if entrepreneur j has an incentive to default strategically.
Furthermore, we assume that all loans are repaid in the normal state, even with full entry19
Condition 5 Dj ￿ ￿p(m) for any ￿nanced entrepreneur j.
The ability to obtain ￿nance depends on investor protection ￿. All entrepreneurs need to raise
some initial funding at date 3, and, contingent on a shock, for re￿nancing at date 4. In the
normal state, all entrepreneurs who were able to start a ￿rm, produce an apple pie. With no loss
19We solve explicitly below for these restrictions in the di⁄erent equilibria.
￿11 ￿of generality, entrepreneurs invest all their wealth in the project, so after a shock they all need
re￿nancing to produce.20
Date 4: Re￿nance Stage
We ￿rst identify the critical values of minority protection which allow re￿nancing. It is easy
to see that there are two values ￿
￿ and ￿
￿￿, such that for ￿ > ￿
￿￿ no entrepreneur is re￿nanced,
if ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿
￿ only rich entrepreneurs will be re￿nanced, and if ￿ > ￿
￿ all entrepreneurs are
re￿nanced. These thresholds for re￿nancing depend on interim leverage Dj. We ￿rst compute them
as a function of the required repayment Dj, and then compute the equilibrium level of Dj set at
the stage of initial ￿nancing for both types of entrepreneurs.
Consider the re￿nancing decision after a shock, and recall that all entrepreneurs prefer to re￿-
nance. 21 Entrepreneur j will not be re￿nanced when
minf￿pS;1 ￿ !j + ￿g < M + ￿: (10)
The LHS is the amount entrepreneur j can credibly promise to repay. The RHS represents the
payo⁄ for the bank if it seizes the salvage value M.
If ￿ is su¢ ciently small such that j has an incentive to default when all entrepreneurs would
produce, i.e. ￿p(m) = ￿(a ￿ m
1￿m) < Dj + ￿, and (10) is satis￿ed, the bank refuses to re￿nance j,






since by assumption 1 ￿ !j > M for all j. This leads to a ￿rst general result
Lemma 3 Some entrepreneurs will be not re￿nanced if ￿ < ￿
￿ and all will be otherwise.
Thus in a shock state, full entry is not an equilibrium if the enforceable payment from re￿nancing
is less than the salvage value, in which case only some entrepreneurs are active after a shock. Rich
and poor entrepreneurs are equally e¢ cient, but the poor have higher leverage, and this undermines
their ability to commit to a full repayment. If instead (10) is not satis￿ed for poor entrepreneurs,
it will also not be satis￿ed by the rich, less leveraged ￿rms, in which case, all entrepreneurs are
re￿nanced, and equilibrium pro￿ts equal p(m). In contrast, if only less leveraged entrepreneurs
satisfy (10), then they are forced to exit and pro￿ts will be p(￿R) = a ￿ ￿R
1￿m.
20Rich entrepreneurs may choose to borrow more in order to retain su¢ cient capital ￿ to produce after a shock. In
equilibrium, this is not necessary, since investor protection is always set such that rich entrepreneurs are re￿nanced.
The intuition is that the rich lobby would always seek re￿nancing for the rich. Even if investor protection is such
that also poor entrepreneurs can be re￿nanced, then rich ones certainly can.
21This is always true under the assumption that welfare is increasing in entry.
￿12 ￿Since leverage is decreasing in the amount of own capital, there are values of ￿ such that poorer
entrepreneurs are not re￿nanced, while richer entrepreneurs are. When ￿ < ￿
￿, the poor are not
re￿nanced because they would default ex post. The rich, who are less leveraged, would not default
after the exit of the poor, as long as DR + ￿ ￿ ￿p(￿R). If this condition is satis￿ed, loans to rich
entrepreneurs are riskless. As they borrow DR = 1￿!R, the su¢ cient condition for the rich not to
have an incentive to default becomes
1 ￿ !R + ￿ ￿ ￿p(￿R): (12)
The greater ability by the rich to promise a return to lenders arise from two e⁄ects. First, there
are two components to their lower leverage: they have more money of their own and they do not
pay a default premium, since they can commit not to default. Second, they can fund themselves at
a lower ￿ when pro￿ts are higher (since p(m) < p(￿R)), because highly leveraged ￿rms exit.







p(m) if ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
1￿!R+￿
p(￿R) if ￿ < ￿
￿
; (13)
conditional on them receiving funding in the ￿rst place.
Date 3: Funding of Initial Investment
We ￿rst look at the case when all entrepreneurs are re￿nanced, i.e. ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ and ￿ ￿ ￿
￿. Since
by assumption, there is no voluntary default, the condition for initial funding for entrepreneur j is
Dj ￿ ￿p(m), (14)
where DP = 1 and DR = 1 ￿ !R.
Now we shift attention to the case where some entrepreneurs are not re￿nanced. If an entrepre-
neur who will not be re￿nanced is able to raise the necessary amount 1 ￿ !j to start a ￿rm, the
face value of her loan is determined by competition to be 1 ￿ !j = qM + (1 ￿ q)Dj, which implies
DNF
j =
1 ￿ !j ￿ qM
1 ￿ q
for j 2 NF. (15)
The banks will lend to entrepreneurs in set NF to start a ￿rm only if
1 ￿ !j ￿ qM + (1 ￿ q)￿p(m): (16)
The RHS represents the payo⁄ to the bank if entrepreneur j would always default.




In conclusion, poor entrepreneurs can obtain ex ante ￿nance if ￿ satis￿es






(1￿q)p(m) if ￿ < ￿
￿ (no re￿nance)
1
p(m) if ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (re￿nance)
. (17)
In this basic setting where entrepreneurs always repay if they are re￿nanced, rich entrepreneurs
will be able to raise the amount they need to start a ￿rm, 1￿!R, as long as ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ and 1￿!R ￿












￿ < ￿, given that ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
: (18)
Thus there are three possible ￿nancial market allocations, which are shown in Table 2. 22
A F NF
Narrow ￿R ￿R ?
Fragile f￿R;￿Pg ￿R ￿P
Broad f￿R;￿Pg f￿R;￿Pg ?
Table 2: Possible ￿nancial market allocations
Table 3 gives an overview of the range of values of ￿ for which the di⁄erent ￿nancial allocations
emerge. Three di⁄erent ￿nancial market outcomes may arise, depending on the scope of ex ante and
ex post access to ￿nance. In a "narrow" ￿nancial allocation, the poor cannot raise initial funding
nor re￿nance, while the rich can. In a "fragile" ￿nancial allocation, both rich and poor raise ￿nance
to enter, but only the rich are able to get re￿nancing after a shock. In a "broad" ￿nancial allocation
all entrepreneurs are able to raise ￿nance and to be re￿nanced if necessary.
Notice that entry ￿nancing can be obtained in general at lower values of ￿ than re￿nancing,
except in a fragile allocation, when exit by the poor ensures higher pro￿ts for the rich and thus may
allow re￿nancing at a lower ￿ than the initial funding.
Rich
Initial funding (￿
￿￿￿￿) Default after shock (￿
￿￿)
Narrow ￿ ￿ 1￿!R
p(￿R) (Y) ￿ ￿ 1￿!R+￿
p(￿R) (N)
Fragile ￿ ￿ 1￿!R
p(m) (Y) ￿ ￿ 1￿!R+￿
p(￿R) (N)
Broad ￿ ￿ 1￿!R
p(m) (Y) ￿ ￿ 1￿!R+￿
p(m) (N)
22We do not describe the case when the rich are denied funding either ex ante or ex post (such as when ￿ < ￿￿￿￿￿),
as they are strictly dominated equilibria which will be eliminated by the endogenous choice of ￿. The intuition is
that there are no values of ￿ such that they would be funded while the rich are not.
￿14 ￿Poor
Initial funding (￿







p(m) (N) ￿ < 1+￿






p(m) (Y) ￿ < 1+￿
p(m) (Y) ￿ < M+￿
p(m) (N)
Broad ￿ ￿ 1
p(m) (Y) ￿ ￿ 1+￿
p(m) (N) Always
Table 2: Financial market allocation conditions for which there is no voluntary default
Note also that for the rich in a Narrow or Broad ￿nancial allocation, entry implies re￿nancing,
so ￿
￿￿ < ￿





Proposition 1 A Narrow ￿nancial market ￿nancial allocation arises only if ￿




1 ￿ !R + ￿
p(￿R)









the Fragile ￿nancial allocation arises only if maxf￿
￿￿;￿
￿￿￿;￿
￿￿￿￿g ￿ ￿ < ￿
￿
maxf











and the Broad ￿nancial allocation arises only if ￿
+ ￿ ￿ < 1
1 + ￿
p(m)
￿ ￿ < 1. (21)
These parameter regions are not overlapping.
Intuitively, ￿ has to be higher to allow broader ex ante access and lower to reduce access to
re￿nancing. Thus ￿ is highest in the Broad ￿nancial allocation, intermediate in the Fragile, and
lowest in the Narrow.
Parameter regions for the Broad allocation always exist under the assumption that projects have
positive NPV, i.e. p(m) > 1 + ￿. Henceforth we assume that parameters are such that the Narrow
and Fragile allocations are both attainable by an appropriate choice of ￿.
3.5 Political Equilibrium
The lobbyists formulate their o⁄er to maximize the net rent generated for their constituency, namely
by seeking to ensure entry for all its members. Ensuring access to funding for the poor also guar-
antees access for richer entrepreneurs, who need less. Thus the lobbyist for the poor entrepreneurs
￿15 ￿supports a welfare-maximizing full entry, or ￿ ￿ ￿
+ = 1+￿
p(m), which ensures funding and re￿nancing
for all entrepreneurs. The rich lobby needs to make a better o⁄er, else broad access prevails.
The lobbyist which maximizes the rents for the rich prefers narrow over broad entry, and in case
of a shock , prefers a fragile over a broad allocation of funding (i.e., no re￿nancing for the poor who
are then forced to exit). To these goals, the rich lobby o⁄ers a political contribution such that the
politicians are just indi⁄erent to accept their proposed ￿L over the proposal of the other lobbyist.
The required contribution the rich have to pay, E[LR(￿L)], needs to compensate for the loss in
welfare relative to the social optimum of full entry, when n = m in all states, given by








where E[WMAX] ￿ (1 ￿ m)(!c + 1
2( m
1￿m)2) + m(p(m) ￿ q￿ ￿ 1). In addition they must pay the
contribution that the lobby of poor entrepreneurs is willing to pay for access, which at most can
amount to their entire surplus from production.
Note that E[LR(￿L)] is decreasing in ￿L, because welfare is increasing in n, which in turn is
increasing in ￿. Hence limiting access requires higher bribes.
First consider the expected pay o⁄ of the rich in a Narrow ￿nancial allocation
E[￿R
















2(1￿m) + ￿P(a ￿ q￿ ￿ 1)].
The ￿rst term are rents under narrow entry, the second term is the lobby compensation for
the amount the poor are willing to o⁄er, and the third term is the expected political contribution
needed to compensate for the welfare loss from reduced entry.
The expected pro￿t of the rich in case of a Fragile ￿nancial allocation is
E[￿R
Fragile] = (1 ￿ q)￿R(p(m) ￿ 1) + q￿R(p(￿R) ￿ ￿ ￿ 1) (24)
















2(1￿m) + ￿P(a ￿ ￿ ￿ 1)] is the lobby contribution in the shock state.
The expected pro￿t of the rich in case of a Broad ￿nancial allocation is
E[￿R
Broad] = ￿R(p(m) ￿ q￿ ￿ 1). (25)
￿16 ￿The rich lobbyist chooses its o⁄er to induce the preferred ￿ which maximizes its expected rents.
Hence we need to pairwise compare these three expressions. The key determinants are political
accountability, ￿, and the mass of the rich, ￿R.
Therefore we rewrite the inequalities such that
￿
1￿￿ is a function of ￿R. Note that
￿
1￿￿ is strictly










1￿m ￿ (p(m) ￿ 1 ￿ q￿)
￿ m+￿R
2(1￿m) + a ￿ q￿ ￿ 1
￿ ￿
BN:
This inequality compares the two polar allocations, where access to ￿nance is either complete or most
restrictive. Here (pNarrow ￿pBroad) is the di⁄erence in pro￿t between the two equilibria23, E[Poor] =
￿P(p(m)￿q￿￿1) is the compensation necessary to match the expected amount the poor are willing
to o⁄er to obtain full access to ￿nance, and E[Contribution Welfare Loss] = E[LR(￿Narrow)] is the
expected amount to compensate for the welfare loss due to narrow entry. The numerator represents
the pro￿t di⁄erence minus the amount for the poor per poor individual, while the denominator is
the political contribution per poor individual. Notice that the former is increasing in ￿R, the latter
is decreasing in ￿R. Thus when the number of rich individuals is greater, the narrow entry outcome
is less expensive to achieve.




=) (1 ￿ q)(pNarrow ￿ pBroad) ￿ (1 ￿ q)(Poor)







1￿m ￿ (p(m) ￿ 1)
￿ m+￿R
2(1￿m) + a ￿ 1
￿ ￿
FN:
Here (pNarrow ￿ pBroad) is the pro￿t di⁄erence in the Narrow and the Broad allocation, which the
rich enjoy with probability 1￿q, while (Poor)N = ￿P(p(m)￿1) is the amount the poor are willing
to pay the politicians in the normal state. Finally,















2(1￿m) + ￿P(a ￿ 1)]
is the amount the rich have to pay in the normal state to compensate for the welfare loss of
limited entry. Note the interpretation of the numerator and denominator is analogous to (26).
Because pay o⁄s in these two equilibria only di⁄er in the normal state, the inequality is invariant
to ￿.
23Note this di⁄erence is not dependent on the state of the world.
￿17 ￿The following inequality compares the pay o⁄to the rich across equilibria whose access to ￿nance
for the poor is limited only after a shock . Hence this inequality is invariant to q.
E[￿Broad] ￿ E[￿R
Fragile] (28)
=) q(pNarrow ￿ pBroad) ￿ q(Poor)







1￿m ￿ (p(m) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿)
￿ m+￿R
2(1￿m) + a ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
￿ ￿
BF:
The interpretation of terms is similar to the previous equation, while now the contribution o⁄ered
by the poor lobby is ￿P(p(m) ￿ ￿ ￿ 1). Note that this inequality is invariant with respect to q.
These three inequalities de￿ne three parameter regions for ￿ and ￿R, depicted in Figure 2:This
leads to our main result.
Proposition 2 When ￿ ￿ ￿
BF; the political equilibrium leads to a broad ￿nancial regime. When
￿
FN < ￿ < ￿
BF; the political equilibrium is a fragile ￿nancial regime. When ￿
FN ￿ ￿; the political
equilibrium is a narrow ￿nancial regime.
The proof is immediate from evaluating the net gain for the rich lobby to pursue their preferred




Moreover, note that for
￿
1￿￿ around ￿
BN; the rich strictly prefer the Fragile allocation. Therefore
￿
FN and ￿
BF are the two relevant thresholds which determine the lobbying outcome.
In conclusion, accountability determines what the rich may need to pay to obtain their preferred
level of investor protection, and thus the ￿nancial regime.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
4 Comparative Statics and Extensions
The previous section established that accountability is the critical factor in determining ￿nancial
access and the degree of ￿nancial stability. A higher political accountability increases the lobbying
contribution needed to limit entry or force exit. Beyond some threshold, it discourages lobbying
altogether, resulting in an e¢ cient ￿nancial market which is both stable and grants broad ￿nancial
access, leading to maximum entry.
A direct empirical implication is that the least accountable countries will have very low investor
protection, and thus less ￿nancial development. This result is derived and con￿rmed empirically
in Perotti and Volpin (2004). Our contribution is to extend the result to ￿nancial stability (or
equivalently, to include both entry and exit). A reliable ￿nancial system, de￿ned as a system
￿18 ￿which limits ine¢ cient default after external shocks, will arise only when political accountability is
su¢ ciently large to discourage lobbying for ￿nancial fragility in order to force exit.
We consider next the e⁄ect of the other major variables, namely wealth inequality, demand and
volatility of shocks.
To consider the impact of inequality we assume, very realistically, that there are more poor than
rich, so that ￿R < ￿P:The standard measure of wealth inequality, the Gini coe¢ cient, in our setup is
the di⁄erence between average wealth and median wealth: If we limit attention to inequality among
entrepreneurs, which is where it plays a role, the Gini coe¢ cient equals m￿R!R
24. Thus inequality
increases either as the mass of rich agents ￿R increases (as long as it remains smaller than ￿P), or
as !R increases. Examining ￿
FN and ￿
BF, we ￿nd that
Lemma 4 Ceteris paribus, a Narrow entry equilibrium requires that the rich be su¢ ciently nu-
merous. The minimum size of the rich block to sustain a Narrow equilibrium is increasing in
accountability.
The intuition is that limiting entry to a small elite imposes high welfare losses. A similar result
may be stated concerning the ability of the rich lobby to create fragility in a ￿nancial system which
allows broad entry.
We consider now the other component of inequality, namely the wealth of the rich. A ￿rst e⁄ect
of a larger !R is that the di⁄erential in leverage between rich and poor increases. From our earlier
results, this implies that it is easier to exclude the poor from ￿nancial access via a lower degree
of protection (e.g., it makes it easier to achieve nnarrow entry, as the higher investor protection
required to ensure re￿nancing of rich entrepreneurs does not imply entry by poor entrepreneurs).
A second e⁄ect, described in the previous lemma, is that a larger ￿R reduces the cost of blocking
further entry as output by rich entrepreneurs is larger.25 Therefore, we obtain
Proposition 3 For a given level of accountability, the larger is wealth inequality, the easier it is
for the rich to block access to ￿nance for other groups, as long as the poor are more numerous than
the rich.
The proof is by inspection of the conditions ￿
FN and ￿
BF:
This coincides with the ￿ndings in Perotti and Volpin (2004). They show that in a cross-section
of 38 countries, both higher accountability and lower income inequality are associated with better
e⁄ective investor protection, even after controlling for legal origin and per-capita income.
24If we include consumers, the Gini coe¢ cient equals m￿R!R ￿ (1 ￿ m)!C, which is monotonous in the measure
we use, provided that !R > !C.
25In Perotti-Volpin (2004), the endogenous size of the elite increases with accountability.
￿19 ￿The comparative statics for the impact of the level of demand and volatility of shocks on the
size of the parameter space of the three equilibria are summarized in Table 3.
Narrow Fragile Broad
a (NPV) # # "
q (prob. of shock ) 0 0 0
￿ (size of shock ) 0 " #
Table 3: Comparative statics for volatility and demand
An increase in a, i.e. an increase in demand for the ￿nal good, increases, ceteris paribus, the
NPV of production. At the same time, since consumers value the good more highly, their welfare
is reduced more by lower entry. As a result, the cost to lobby for limited access is increasing in a.26
Proposition 4 Higher demand reduces fragility, as it leads to a downward shift of ￿
BF and ￿
NF;
reducing the area of the fragile ￿nancial system in favor of the Broad one.
Formally, ￿
BF and ￿
NF both decrease in a, but ￿
BF decreases faster in a than ￿
NF.
We turn next to the second moment of pro￿tability. The volatility of external shocks can be
decomposed in the probability of a shock and its size. An intuitive result, which however arises for
surprising reasons, is that larger shocks are associated with greater ￿nancial fragility. The reason
is not that they imply larger losses: since re￿nancing all projects remains e¢ cient, appropriate
investor protection would still ensure re￿nancing and thus rule out default. Rather, larger shocks
create fragility because they reduce the value of production but, unlike lower demand, do not a⁄ect
welfare. As a result, shocks a⁄ects rents but do not a⁄ect lobbying costs, nor the political demand
for bribes. Therefore
Proposition 5 Larger shocks induce stronger lobbying contributions to limit entry and, when entry
cannot be blocked, to force exit via greater ￿nancial fragility.
Finally, we consider the e⁄ect of a mean-preserving spread in external shocks, by increasing ￿
while keeping q￿ constant. The result is consistent with the previous lemma: a mean-preserving
increase in volatility a⁄ects only ￿
BF, and so enlarges the region of ￿nancial fragility. Once again,
this increase in fragility does not result from the inability of ￿rms to compensate for the shock .
Rather, it arises from the increased willingness of the rich lobby to expend resources to block entry
to compensate for the lower expected rents.
26Thus greater pro￿tability may be associated with more entry, but for not for the most obvious reason.
￿20 ￿4.1 Domestic Funding and Welfare Costs of Default
In this section we relax the assumption that default losses do not a⁄ect welfare because they are
solely born by foreign capital.
We extend the basic model to the case where endowments of domestic investors are used to fund
projects. We simplify by assuming that default costs are born fully by some domestic investors in
which case the entire endowment of these a⁄ected agents is used to partially compensate investors)
or a equal distribution of default losses, which have the same e⁄ect on aggregate welfare. Formally,
concentrated losses have a smoother impact on demand for the ￿nal good, while an equal distribution
of losses a⁄ects demand only when losses are large enough, and thus creates a discontinuity. Since
the results are qualitatively similar, we focus here on the technically simpler concentrated case.
The main e⁄ect is that it becomes more expensive to lobby for the Fragile ￿nancial system, hence
the Broad and Narrow equilibria become more attractive relative to the Fragile equilibrium. The
introduction of welfare losses caused by demand drops does not change the relative attractiveness of
the Broad versus the Narrow equilibrium, because demand is not a⁄ected in both equilibria. Hence
the curves shift as depicted in Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Formally, assume that idle domestic agents (consumers and inactive entrepreneurs) can only
deposit their endowment in the bank27. In case of a shock we assume a randomly chosen fraction
￿ ￿ ￿MAX ￿ minf
R
j2NF(1 ￿ !j) dj
(1 ￿ m)!c +
R
j= 2A !j dj
;1g;
of these domestic agents lose their total endowment and have zero income. The fraction in the
equation represents the ratio of the size of the initial loans to the entrepreneurs who will not be
￿nanced over total endowments of idle agents. In this case, total demand for apple pies shrinks.




j = 2A dj￿. Therefore after
a shock, demand drops to
(1 ￿ m ￿
￿C R
j2NF(1 ￿ !j) dj
!c





!c represents the mass of consumers who bear the default costs and hence
have zero demand for apple pies. So in equilibrium, the price in the shock state is
pD = a ￿
nS
1 ￿ m ￿ c
: (30)
27Note this implies that these consumers are not able to demand a default premium to compensate them for utility
loss of the shock state in the normal state. Hence the equilibria curves in Figure 2 will not change. The only e⁄ect














1￿m + ￿P(a ￿ ￿ ￿ 1)
< ￿
BF: (31)
Notice this inequality coincides with its counterpart in the basic model when c = 0.
There are two e⁄ects at work. Demand drops, so the pro￿t di⁄erence between the two equilibria
is reduced. This reduces the incentive to lobby for fragility. Furthermore, the political contribution
required to restrict re￿nance increases because welfare is also reduced by the default costs.28
Hence, the larger is the domestically funded share of investment costs, the less likely is a Fragile
￿nancial allocation relative to the Broad allocation.
Also E[￿R
Fragile] ￿ E[￿R
Narrow] changes. In the shock state, the di⁄erence between the Fragile















) < 0; (32)
which represents the di⁄erences in pro￿t and the political contribution. Thus the Fragile equilibrium






1￿m￿c) + (1 ￿ q)[￿R
m￿￿R
1￿m ￿ ￿P(p(m) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿)]
q(c!c + ￿R
1￿m￿c ￿ ￿R
1￿m) + (1 ￿ q)(￿
m2￿￿2
R
2(1￿m) + ￿P(a ￿ 1))
> ￿
FN: (33)
Note that this inequality collapses to its counterpart in the basic model for c = 0. Notice that
defaults occur only in the fragile ￿nancial allocation. Hence there is now a welfare loss through
demand in a fragile equilibrium, while the other equilibria are una⁄ected.
Proposition 6 Welfare losses associated with default reduces the parameter space for which a fragile
￿nancial equilibrium emerges.
Intuitively, welfare su⁄ers from default in a fragile equilibrium, so it is more expensive to lobby
for fragility.
The proof is that pro￿ts after a shock are now lower, as demand drops by c =
￿
C￿P
!c , the mass
of consumers who bear the default cost. Thus the introduction of domestic funding of losses a⁄ects
the relative payo⁄ for the rich lobby between stable and fragile ￿nancial allocations.
4.2 Strategic Default
In the basic model, investors are sure to receive the collateral M when they refuse re￿nancing, as
it is the case in any reliable secured lending. If entrepreneurs were able to avoid the enforcement of
28This can be seen in the denominator of (31). The ￿rst term re￿ects the loss in consumer welfare. The second
and third terms represent the contribution needed to lobby for an equilibrium with default.
￿22 ￿this collateral obligations, in some circumstances they may not seek re￿nancing nor to produce at
all, and simply appropriate the collateralized assets. If the state of nature is not contractible, and
as long as the loan repayment is not yet due, lenders could not secure a contingent shift in control
to prevent stealing.
In principle, collateral obligations would force entrepreneurs to return any appropriated collat-
eral. This section studies the possibility that active entrepreneurs may choose to lobby to weaken
the enforcement of such laws. This may occur after a shock, when net pro￿tability is so low that
it is better to avoid producing and abscond with the ￿rm assets. We de￿ne this a case of strategic
default.29
Extending our notion of lobbying, we assume that a political choice determines whether creditor
rights, and speci￿cally collateral laws, are enforced ex post (a case of contingent enforcement). In
the absence of lobbying, politicians prefer to enforce collateral laws in order to induce more output.
Thus strategic default leads to lower welfare, and lobbyists have to compensate politicians with
contributions.
Because appropriating collateral generates no veri￿able revenues ex post, entrepreneurs who
lobby for weak enforcement of collateral laws must pay their contributions with cash in advance.
To simplify matters, we assume that only the rich are able to raise enough ￿nance to be able (after
funding entry) to pay the up-front bribes required for ex post lobbying. Whenever the rich lobby
for weak enforcement of creditor rights, also poor entrepreneurs could bene￿t.30
Under what conditions rich entrepreneurs have an incentive to lobby to appropriate the collat-
eral? Intuitively, the incentive is always greater when bribing is cheaper, namely when ￿ is low.
This suggests that strategic default is more likely in more corrupt systems.
This intuition is indeed con￿rmed here: when ￿ is su¢ ciently large, there will be no strategic
default in equilibrium. We have shown earlier that high accountability leads to a Fragile or Broad
entry equilibrium. The following condition identi￿es when strategic default may be ruled out in
such cases:
Condition 6 Strategic default never occurs in both a Broad and Fragile ￿nancial regime if
￿ <
￿






29Technically, also the basic model has a form of strategic default, as the borrower repays less than due even though
pro￿ts would be su¢ cient for a full repayment. Here, the diversion of assets is complete.
30Weaker ex post creditor rights do not bene￿t the poor as it undermine their chance to be funded ex ante, except




￿ + (M ￿ p(m) + 1 ￿ !R)
1 ￿ m￿
: (35)
Thus when when accountability is high, and/or the external shock is not too large, there is no
incentive to default in equilibria with full entry, which arises at high levels of accountability. 31
But in such cases the required bribe for violating creditor rights ex post is very costly. As a result,
accountability reduces the temptation to strategically default.
Intuitively, this implies that strategic default is most likely in less accountable countries which
choose a narrow entry equilibrium. For simplicity, we will focus on this most relevant case.32
We focus on the case when lobbying for strategic default takes place only after a shock, as it is
most attractive when pro￿tability of production is lower.33 Moreover, if there was an incentive to
default in the normal state, there would simply never be any lending.34
In this case of a narrow entry equilibrium, the bank will price the loan D to the rich entrants
according to the break even condition




The entering entrepreneurs must be able to fund both entry and the lobbying bribes in case of
a shock, so their loan must satisfy
L ￿ 1 ￿ !R + C
where C is the bribe for weaker creditor rights (the appendix contains an analysis of its functional
form). The rich are able to borrow the bribe if they will repay it in the normal state, i.e. DR =
L=(1 ￿ q) < ￿p(￿R). This condition implies a lower bound for ￿, which is of course increasing in
￿: Less immediately intuitively, the required contribution is decreasingly in ￿; the reason is that
the welfare loss caused by strategic default and thus no output is lower when output is costlier to
produce. Hence a larger shock makes it actually easier to bribe for strategic default.
Incorporating the conditions requited for a narrow entry equilibrium, we obtain a general con-
dition for strategic default in the narrow equilibrium:
31The most binding constraint is actually in the broad entry equilibrium, since the incentive to avoid producing
and abscond with the collateral is greatest when pro￿ts are lowest.
32The more general results, rather elaborated, indicate that strategic default is possible also in more accountable
countries for extremely large shocks.
33This e⁄ect is somewhat ambiguous in a Fragile ￿nancial system, as it depend on the e⁄ect of exit on pro￿ts.
34Technically, ￿ cannot be so low that the rich choose to capture collateral all the time; in such a corrupt country,
there would be no lending, unless the government o⁄ers complete debt relief to investors after a default.
￿24 ￿Condition 7
￿ > a ￿ 1 ￿ (
1 ￿ qM
p(m)












p(m) p(￿R) ￿ (1 ￿ !R)
f￿ ￿R
2(1￿m) + (a ￿ 1 ￿ ￿) ￿ Mg
(38)
Note that this condition is more easily satis￿ed when !R is large, thus when inequality is larger
and collateral M and the shock ￿ is larger.
Under this condition of minimum political accountability, we obtain
Proposition 7 In the Narrow equilibrium strategic default always occurs after a shock if
















The proposition con￿rms that strategic default will tend to occur in low accountability countries,
and especially after large shocks. 35
Figure 4 displays these conditions and the proposition in
￿
1￿￿=￿ space.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
5 Empirical Evidence
This section explores some empirical evidence on the conjecture put forth in this paper (for more
extensive empirical results, see Feijen, 2005).
If limited ￿nancial access is the outcome of opportunistic lobbying, either to block new entrants
or to limit their re￿nancing during crises, then we should observe abnormal exit in industries which
are heavily dependent on external ￿nance in countries with a high level of corruption (i.e. low ￿).
More generally, a consequence of excess exit would be that pro￿t margins during banking crises
would be higher in industries which are heavily dependent on external ￿nance, but only in countries
35The e⁄ect of a can be evaluated by simplifying (39) for !R = m = 1
2 and ￿R = 1
4:The results suggest that
strategic default is more likely when demand for the ￿nished product is weak.
￿25 ￿with low accountability and a high level of corruption. The only plausible alternative model which
would produce such a speci￿c outcome would be that corruption is correlated with other causes of
poor access to ￿nance, a possibility we will test for.
We employ a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three digit manufacturing
industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division (see Feijen, 2005). The
regression measure the e⁄ect of systemic banking crises in the period of 1988-1997 in about 15
countries (both developed and developing) on about 20 industries. Institutional indices used are
corruption and law and order from the International Country Risk Guide. All indices are on a
scale of 0-6. Both corruption and law and order quality are increasing in their respective indices.
The external dependence measure for young ￿rms on the industry level is drawn from Rajan and
Zingales (1998). The timing of systemic banking crises is from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).
The basic OLS regression model36 is
￿Yi;c = Constant + ￿1 ￿ Ic + ￿2 ￿ Ii + ￿3 ￿ START Yi;c (40)
+￿3 ￿ EDi ￿ INSTITUTIONc + ￿4 ￿ EDi ￿ FDc
+"i;c;
where ￿Yi;c is the relative change during a systemic banking crises in industry i of country c of
the dependent variable of interest (i.e., either the number of producers (EST) or the pro￿t margin
(PCM) of sector i of country c), Ic and Ii are country- and industry-speci￿c e⁄ects, START.Yi;c
is the average value of the dependent variable before the crisis and EDi ￿ INSTITUTIONc is an
interaction term of external dependence and the average value of a speci￿c index of ICRG before
the crisis (where INSTITUTIONc is increasing in institutional quality), and EDi ￿ FDc is an
interaction term with the average ￿nancial development of a country before the crisis, measured by
the domestic private credit via banks to GDP, taken from the World Development Indicators. Note
that the country-￿xed e⁄ects absorb some missing information relative to the timing and depth of
individual ￿nancial crises.
The coe¢ cient of main interest is ￿3. We would expect signi￿cant coe¢ cients with signs ￿3 > 0
and ￿3 < 0 if the relative changes in the price-cost margin and in the number of producers are the
dependent variables, respectively. The basic regressions are reproduced in Tables I (for margins)
and II (on number of producers).
[Insert Table I and Table II here]
In Table I, the interaction term with corruption is positive and highly signi￿cant (at the 1%
level), implying that margins are relatively higher in dependent industries in corrupt countries.
36This methodology is similar to Laeven et al (2002).
￿26 ￿Also the interaction with the average institutional index is signi￿cant. Note START.Yi;c is also
highly signi￿cant, suggesting that pro￿ts drops more when they were already high.
Similarly, in Table II, only the interaction term with corruption is positive and signi￿cant at the
5% level, implying that there is relatively more exit in dependent industries of corrupt countries.
Interestingly, interactions with other institutional variables -although correlated with corruption -
in both Table I and II do not enter signi￿cantly. This provides more support for corruption as the
relevant measure of institutional quality,which is consistent with our theory of lobbying.
Next, we document that the e⁄ect in Table I is non-linear and more important for highly corrupt
countries. Table III presents the results.
[Insert Table III here]
It may be that the e⁄ect is non linear in the measure of corruption. Model (1) and (2) run the
basic regression for the most and least corrupt countries, respectively. The interaction term is in
fact signi￿cant for the most corrupt countries. Model (3) adds an interaction term with a squared
corruption index. Both interaction terms are signi￿cant and suggest the e⁄ect ￿ attens for a low
level of the corruption index. Models (4)-(6) show the results of quantile regressions for the 10, 50,
and, 90 percent quantiles of the dependent variable, respectively.37 Note that the coe¢ cient of the
interaction term almost doubles for the countries with the highest PCMs.
Finally, we test an alternative model, which would suggest that there is a correlation between
corruption and classic ￿nancial frictions such as moral hazard and/or asymmetric information. Ac-
cordingly, we rank industries not on external dependence but on industry-level opaqueness measures.
This measure, computed from US data, is based on the methodology of Durnev, Morck, and Yeung
(2004), which exploits the notion that a higher ratio of industry-level stock price co-movement to
idiosyncratic volatility of individual shares indicates a lower capacity by investors to perceive ￿rm
speci￿c information. Durnev et al. (2004) argue that more opaque industries are more vulnerable to
agency costs. Lower values of the information index imply less informative stock prices. Therefore,
we expect the interaction term to be positive for the change in PCM, but negative for the change
in EST. Table IV indeed provide support for this hypothesis.
[Insert Table IV here]
The coe¢ cients imply that less informative industries in more corrupt countries experience
relatively higher pro￿t margins and higher exit rates during crises.
37Ordinary least squares regression aim at computing the conditional mean of the dependent variable. Quantile
regression estimates conditional quantile functions for the distribution of the dependent variable. The 0.5 quantile is
a special case and gives an estimation for the conditional median.
￿27 ￿6 Conclusions
We have o⁄ered a political economy theory on ￿nancial fragility, in which vulnerability to shocks
may be a deliberate choice when policy is captured by special interests under an unequal wealth
distribution.
A politically induced vulnerability arises because lobbying by powerful groups, particularly
strong in a context of poor accountability and large inequality, will be directed to limit access
to ￿nance by competing producers. Even when the broadening of ￿nancial access cannot be blocked
by the powerful, they may still lobby to induce a suboptimal level of investor protection to reduce
access after a shock, and forcing exit. Even in a market based ￿nancial allocation, it is possible to
force exit by poorer entrepreneurs after a crisis, since their ￿rms are more leveraged. and access to
￿nance is therefore more vulnerable in a climate of poor investor protection. This leads to ine¢ cient,
avoidable default.
In related work (Feijen and Perotti, 2005), we study a distinct form of politically induced ￿-
nancial vulnerability. This arises when government guarantees to investors create an incentive for
entrepreneurs to default strategically.38 Since strategic default may be feasible only in equilibria
with blocked or fragile entry, it is more likely to emerge in less politically accountable systems.39
We show that economies which are subject to more volatile shocks (such as commodity
economies) are more likely to end up in a fragile equilibrium, because volatility reduces rents and
thus induces stronger lobbying for fragility. Hence volatile commodity prices may induce ￿nancial
crises not just directly, but also via an endogenous political vulnerability.
As in all lobbying model, we assume consumers are too dispersed to organize themselves (Gross-
man and Helpmann, 1994).40 Lobbying allows established interests to block entry even when com-
peting producers can organize themselves because entry-blocking policies produce larger pure rents,
and thus more resources for bribes. Only when the political cost of economic entrenchment by the
elite becomes too high, their lobby may fail to block entry. Yet ￿nancial crises o⁄er an additional
opportunity to distort outcomes, especially when the blame may be assigned to external factors,
such as trade shocks or an IMF intervention.
What institutions help avoiding the capture of the reform process? We argue that greater demo-
cratic accountability increases public scrutiny on the reform process and constraints opportunistic
legislation. Keefer (2001) argues that a larger number of veto players reduces political incentives
38See Krugman (1998) for a similar argument to explain the Asian crisis.
39Although strategic default leads to a redistribution and hence does not a⁄ect welfare directly, larger inequality
could have indirect adverse e⁄ects.
40Bene￿ciaries of U.S. bank branching regulation lobbied successfully for years for entry restrictions despite high
costs to consumers (Stiroh and Strahan, 2003).
￿28 ￿to cater to special interests, and shows that in such cases governments grant lower transfers to
the ￿nancial sector and are less likely to exercise forbearance with insolvent institutions. Haber
(1991) shows that while Brazilian textile industry in the 19th century became more competitive
due to political changes which triggered liberalization and banking development, in Por￿rio Diaz￿ s
Mexico the elite controlled access to ￿nance, creating less e¢ cient producers. Haber (2004) argues
that increased political competition across states in the federal US system in the 1880s increased
accountability and forced local ￿nancial intermediaries to face competition, in contrast to Mexico
where banking remained extremely concentrated and politically connected to the autocracy under
Diaz.
In conclusion, ￿nancial development is at serious risk of capture in unequal countries with un-
accountable political regimes. In such contexts, policies aimed at ￿nancial broadening are more
justi￿ed than market deepening measures. In addition, special attention should be given to re￿-
nancing opportunities, especially for smaller ￿rms. The ultimate goal should be to improve investor
protection so as to provide a level playing ￿eld and equalize opportunities for less rich but (at
least) equally talented individuals. More generally, attention should perhaps shift from aggregate
measures of ￿nancial development to measures of ￿nancial access, with greater emphasis on the
distribution of ￿nance.































Figure 3: Equilibrium selection in case of domestic funding of banks.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium selection: strategic default in the shocked state of
the Narrow equilibrium. The C and P are abbreviations for condition
and proposition, respectively.
￿31 ￿Conditions for the Strategic Default Section:
First, we consider the case where ￿ is high or intermediate. There are no incentives to strategi-
cally default in the Broad equilibrium after a shock when
M ￿ CB;s < p(m) ￿ (1 ￿ !R) ￿ ￿; (41)






mMg. The term within brackets re￿ ects the ex post welfare loss with stealing of collateral. Note
that all entrepreneurs default, but the bribe is split among the rich. This inequality implies
￿
B;s ￿
M ￿ p(m) + 1 ￿ !R + ￿
￿ m2





Second, to avoid stealing by the rich in the shocked state of the Fragile equilibrium we require
M ￿ CF;s < p(￿R) ￿ (1 ￿ !R) ￿ ￿; (43)





2(1￿m) + m(a ￿ 1 ￿ ￿) ￿ mMg. This yields
￿
F;s ￿
M ￿ p(￿R) + 1 ￿ !R + ￿
￿ m2







B;s, because the bribe is less expensive and the opportunity costs of normal
repayment are higher in the Fragile equilibrium.
Third, the Broad and Fragile equilibrium do not di⁄er in terms of production in the normal state,
hence the functional form of the bribe will be identical. Therefore, to prevent stealing incentives in
the normal state of the Broad and the Fragile equilibrium, we need that stealing is less attractive
than re￿nancing and repaying. Because we assumed there is no default after a shock, the condition
is
M ￿ CBF;n < p(m) ￿ (1 ￿ !R); (45a)









M ￿ p(m) + 1 ￿ !R
￿ m2






B;s is strictly larger because the shock makes the bribe cheaper and the opportunity
costs of normal repayment lower.
￿32 ￿Table I: Change in Industry-level Price-Cost Margins in a Systemic Banking Crisis
This table reports OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the relative change in industry-
level price cost margins (PCM) in a banking crisis. Independent variables are the average PCM
before the crisis, and interaction terms of external dependence of young ￿rms (from Rajan and
Zingales, 1998) with pre-crisis country-level measures of 1) private credit via banks to GDP (WDI),
2) corruption (higher value means higher corruption, ICRG), 3) law and order (higher value means
better law and order, ICRG), and 4) an simple average of these indices (where a higher value
means better institutions). *, **, *** indicate signi￿cance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Relative change of industry-level price cost margins in crisis
(1) (2) (3)
PCM before crisis -2.453 -2.479 -2.466
(0.433)*** (0.434)*** (0.433)***




Ext. dep.*Law and Order -0.022
(0.021)
Ext. dep.*Institutional index -0.041
(0.019)**
Country-specific effects? Y Y Y
Industry-specific effects? Y Y Y
Observations 316 316 316
R-squared 0.42 0.41 0.41
￿33 ￿Table II: Change in Industry-level Number of Establishments in a Systemic Banking
Crisis
This table reports OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the relative change in the industry-
level number of establishments (EST) in a banking crisis. Independent variables are the average
number of establishments before the crisis, and interaction terms of external dependence of young
.￿rms (from Rajan and Zingales, 1998) with country-level measures of 1) private credit via banks
to GDP (WDI), 2) corruption (higher value means higher corruption, ICRG), 3) law and order
(higher value means better law and order, ICRG), and 4) an simple average of these indices (where
a higher value means better institutions). *, **. *** indicate signi￿cance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Heteroskedasticity robuststandard errors are reported in parentheses.
Relative change of industry-level number of establishments in
crisis
(1) (2) (3)
EST before crisis -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)




Ext. dep.*Law and Order 0.005
(0.019)
Ext. dep.*Institutional index 0.022
(0.018)
Country-specific effects? Y Y Y
Industry-specific effects? Y Y Y
Observations 260 260 260
R-squared 0.51 0.50 0.51
￿34 ￿Table III: Non-linear E⁄ect of Corruption
This table reports OLS and quantile regressions. The dependent variable is the percentage
change in industry-level price-cost margins (PCM) in a banking crisis . Independent variables are
the average PCM before the crisis, and interaction terms of external dependence of young ￿rms
with country-level measures of 1) corruption (higher value means higher corruption, ICRG) and 2)
corruption squared. In Panel A the one percent tails of the dependent variable have been dropped
to reduce the e⁄ect of outliers. Model (1) and (2) use above and below median corrupt countries,
respectively. Panel B include the results of the 10, 50, and 90 percent quantile regressions. *, **,
*** indicate signi￿cance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
Panel A:




High corruption Low corruption Full sample
PCM before crisis -1.388 -1.305 -1.001
(0.325)*** (0.311)*** (0.209)***
Ext. dep.*Bank credit -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)




Country-specific effects? Y Y Y
Industry-specific effects? Y Y Y
Observations 137 145 282
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.45 0.71 0.48
Panel B:





PCM before crisis -0.476 -1.587 -3.125
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Ext. dep.*Bank credit -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Ext. dep.*Corruption 0.031 0.038 0.079
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Country-specific effects? Y Y Y
Industry-specific effects? Y Y Y
Observations 316 316 316
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.42 0.30 0.48
￿36 ￿Table IV: Industry Opaqueness rather than External Dependence
This table reports OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the industry-level change in
price-cost margins (PCM) or number of establishments (EST) during a banking crisis.
Independent variables are the average price cost margin (number of establishments) before the
crisis and interaction terms of industry opaqueness with corruption, as well as external
dependence of young .￿rms with bank credit. The industry opaqueness measure is taken from
Huang (2005), who uses idiosyncratic risk in stock prices. One percent tails of the basic sample of
the change in establishments have been dropped from the analysis to reduce the e⁄ect of outliers.
*, **, *** indicate signi￿cance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Relative change of industry-level price
cost margins in crisis
Relative change of industry-level number
of establishments in crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PCM before crisis -3.503 -2.640
(1.178)*** (0.442)***
Establishments before crisis -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Ext. dep.*Domestic credit 0.001 -0.000
(0.000)* (0.000)
Opaqueness*Corruption 0.047 0.056 -0.016 -0.024
(0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.014) (0.014)*
Country-specific effects? Y Y Y Y
Industry-specific effects? Y Y Y Y
Observations 328 316 269 257
R-squared 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.54
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